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Accident Compensation Cases

Hartono v Ministry for Primary Industries (HC, 18/12/15)

Judgment Text

JUDGMENT OF NICHOLAS DAVIDSON J 
Nicholas Davidson J
Introduction 
[1]
This case involves the crews of three foreign owned vessels which were fishing in New Zealand waters. 
[2]
The foreign owner is Sajo Oyang Corporation (Sajo), incorporated in the Republic of Korea. It owned three vessels, the Oyang 70, 75 and 77. 
[3]
The 26 crew members involved in the appeal and the second (“cross-appeal”) claim for unpaid wages and other entitlements. The appeal and cross-appeal address the legal pathway for the crew's claim to wages, and whether that includes relief against vessels now forfeit to the Crown. Their right in admiralty to claim against the ships for wages was lost through sinking of one vessel and forfeiture of two vessels. 
[4]
On 18 August 2010, the Oyang 70 sank. Six members of her crew perished. On 3 September 2014, Oyang 77 became forfeit to the Crown after convictions were entered in the Christchurch District Court for offences committed by her Master under the Fisheries Act 1996. On 4 November 2014, the Oyang 75 was also forfeit to the Crown, for offences committed by her Master and four officers. 
[5]
The crew members in these proceedings all worked for Sajo, on the Oyang 70 or the Oyang 77, but none of them had worked on the Oyang 75. All are Indonesian nationals. They allege that they are owed substantial sums by Sajo, arising from wage and holiday pay entitlements. The named appellant in the cross-appeal, a Mr Hartono, was a crew member on the Oyang 70. 
[6]
Sajo and others applied to the District Court for relief against forfeiture under s 256 of the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act), set out at para [44] below. Crew members claimed an interest for unpaid wages. There were three primary questions for determination: 
(i)
Whether the claim for wages had to be determined by the Employment Relations Authority (ERA) or another and different Court, before the crew could claim or be ordered to have an interest in the forfeit vessels. The only way for the crew to establish an interest is by an ERA or other judicial determination as to unpaid wages;1
| X |Footnote: 1
As provided by the Fisheries Act 1996, s 256(1)(b)(ii). 
 
(ii)
Whether the crew members' claims are within the jurisdiction of the District Court; and 
(iii)
Whether the crew members had an interest in either or both of the Oyang 75 and Oyang 77, as forfeit property, for the purposes of s 256 of the Act, regardless of whether they had worked on those vessels. 
[7]
The wage claims are made pursuant to contracts made by Sajo with each of the 26 crew members in Indonesia, where New Zealand employment law does not apply. The crew allege that Sajo sought to circumvent many of the employment protections that New Zealand law offers workers. They allege that their employment was subject to conditions which fall foul of New Zealand employment law. They were allegedly placed “on call” for the duration of their employment, and were forced to work between 12 and 20 hours per day. 
The first District Court judgment 
[8]
His Honour Judge Kellar delivered his first judgment on 22 April 2015. He held that:2
| X |Footnote: 2
Sajo Oyang Corporation of Korea v Ministry for Primary Industries [2015] NZDC 6726 [Sajo (No. 1)]. 
 
“[47]
Where no other court has already determined the interest of any fishing crew in unpaid wages the District Court may make that determination in the course of determining the nature, extent and value of that interest - s 256(1)(b)(ii) and s 256(6)(b) of the Fisheries Act 1996. No prior determination of that interest by the Employment Relations Authority or any court is necessary. ”
[9]
Sajo appeals to this Court against that judgment. It does not accept that the merits of the wage claim can be determined in the proceedings which determine whether the crew members have an interest in the forfeit property, and if so to what extent. 
[10]
Further, Sajo appeals against His Honour's decision as to the jurisdiction of the District Court under s 256 of the Fisheries Act. His Honour held: 
“[48]
The District Court may determine the value of the interest of any crew member and is not limited in that determination by s 29(1) of the District Courts Act 1947. ”
[11]
This jurisdictional issue arose because crew members collectively claim more than $200,000; the limit for a claim in the District Court (in the absence of agreement between the parties). Sajo submits that the District Court was without jurisdiction, and could not circumvent the District Courts Act 1947 by purporting to act under the Fisheries Act.3
| X |Footnote: 3
District Courts Act 1947, s 29. 
 
The second District Court judgment 
[12]
This judgment was delivered on 24 July 2015.4
| X |Footnote: 4
Sajo Oyang Corporation of Korea v Ministry of Primary Industries (No. 2) [2015] NZDC 13876
 
[13]
The first judgment did not address whether the crew members could all claim an interest in the Oyang 75 and 77, when two of the crew had only worked on the Oyang 70, and the other 24 on the forfeited Oyang 77. 
[14]
The crew submitted that s 256 of the Fisheries Act should be interpreted to mean they all had an interest in both forfeit vessels, without needing to have worked on them. 
[15]
The Judge held that the crew could only hold an interest in respect of the ship on which they had worked. The term “forfeit property” in s 256(1)(b), was held to mean “property used in the commission of the offence”, thus linking the vessel involved in the offence to that against which the relief is sought.5
| X |Footnote: 5
At [13]. 
 
[16]
This means that the crew have no interest in the Oyang 75 as “other forfeit property” under s 256(1)(c) of the Fisheries Act 1996. The crew members cross-appeal against this finding. 
[17]
The Judge said further: 
“[20]
The statutory right of action or statutory in rem claim arises when a proceeding in rem has been issued and may be brought only in the High Court. 
[21]
Any maritime lien the fishing crew have in respect of wages is extinguished upon forfeiture. The right to obtain relief against forfeiture may however be a legal or equitable interest in the forfeit property. ”
The Appeal — CIV-2015-409-302 
Where and when the wages claim must be heard 
[18]
Sajo's position is that in order to calculate the claimed “interest” under s 256 with the necessary precision, the predicate for that interest must be determined. That means that before the crew members can establish an interest in forfeit property, they must have their wage claim conclusively determined, including quantum. Without that, Sajo submits the crew members have no foundation for a claim to an interest. 
[19]
Counsel for Sajo, Mr Squire QC, said that this result follows a straightforward interpretation of s 256. That section, he said, acts as a code which governs forfeiture proceedings under the Fisheries Act, and hence it is unlikely that a Court, acting under s 256, is also entitled to determine the foundation of the claim to an interest. Thus, Mr Squire submitted that the Court acting under s 256 is competent to decide the forfeiture claim, but is not competent to undertake an assessment of the antecedent wage claim. Mr Squire employed the expression “forfeiture Court” to address the distinction he draws. 
[20]
Mr Squire buttressed this submission by a thorough analysis of s 256. Section 256(4) provides that the application for relief must contain “sufficient information” to identify the claimed interest in the property. It would therefore be insufficient if the application did not stand on a final determination of the predicate wage claim. Section 256(8) requires that the Court must satisfy itself of the necessity of granting an Order for Relief. The Order must be “necessary” to avoid “manifest injustice or to satisfy an interest referred to in paragraph (b)(ii) … of the definition of interest in subsection (1)”.6
| X |Footnote: 6
Fisheries Act 1996, s 256(8)(a). 
Counsel submitted that the interest in forfeit property could not be sufficiently well-defined for the Court to undertake an assessment of the necessity of making an Order, if the claim to wages was undetermined. 
[21]
Counsel submitted that this conclusion fits the reference to s 256(1)(b)(ii), where “interest” is defined to include that which is “determined by the Employment Relations Authority or any court … in unpaid wages”. The past tense, “determined”, was submitted to be instructive. 
[22]
Further, Mr Squire says that the reference to the ERA indicates that it is the primary forum for determination of wage claims, with the detailed procedures in the Employment Relations Act 2000 regulating such claims. Since it is the primary forum for claims to wages, it is reasonable to infer that the Fisheries legislation conforms to practice. This makes it inappropriate for the District Court or High Court to determine the merits of the wage claim. 
The District Court jurisdiction 
[23]
Sajo challenges the finding that the District Court was acting within jurisdiction when determining claims for relief against forfeiture under s 256, even though the total amount claimed might exceed $200,000. The Judge reasoned that since the District Court was competent to value the interest of the owner of the forfeit property (even where that interest is in excess of $200,000), it would be “unworkable, impracticable and anomalous” for it not to determine the extent of other interests in that property, regardless of their value.7
| X |Footnote: 7
Sajo (No.1), above n 2, at [37]. 
 
[24]
Sajo submitted that the Fisheries Act does not carve out an exception to the District Court's jurisdictional boundary. The determination of the claim for wages involved, contrary to the Judge's finding, a procedure involving a “debt, demand or damages” and as such is only within the Court's jurisdiction if the amount involved is less than $200,000.8
| X |Footnote: 8
District Courts Act 1947, s 29. 
Mr Squire emphasised the fundamental difference between a wage claim and the ascertainment of an interest. As a demand for a debt, the wage claim in this case is caught by s 29 and the total sum claimed means it is not justiciable in the District Court. 
[25]
Sajo says that the Judge erred in concluding that Sajo's interpretation of “court” in s 2 of the Fisheries Act effectively undermined that provision, by depriving the District Court of jurisdiction under the Fisheries Act. Mr Squire said that the District Court could not determine the “interest” before the ERA or a Court has determined the merit and quantum of a claim to wages. On that approach, the Court can still exercise authority under s 256 of the Act, but only when the merit and quantum of a wages claim are finalised. 
[26]
Much rests on Mr Squire's submission that s 256 is a code and as such precludes the Court from simultaneously or sequentially acting under other authority. The contrary view is that even if s 256 is a code, that suggests that all matters relevant to forfeiture may be determined in the same proceedings if not addressed elsewhere. Thus it would be odd if the “code” precluded a determination of the basis for a claimed interest, but not of the interest itself. Hence, I will set out below why I consider Sajo's interpretation of this provision to be incorrect. 
The respondents' position on appeal 
[27]
Mr Lange for the Ministry for Primary Industries (the Ministry), opposed Sajo's appeal and placed weight on the statutory language, including s 256(4)(d), which provides that an applicant need only give an “estimate” of the value of the claimed interest, indicating that absolute precision is not required in the application. Counsel submits this implies that the Act contemplates relief against forfeiture claims being made without final determination of the merit and quantum of a claim to wages. 
[28]
Further, s 256(6)(b) requires that the Court determine the nature, extent and “if possible” the value of the interest, which led Mr Lange to submit that the Act contemplates a contingent decision in forfeiture proceedings. That is, the Act permits the Court to make orders in its forfeiture jurisdiction with knowledge that a final decision as to the predicate wage claim might alter or displace the valuation of the interest. A wage claim may have succeeded before the ERA, but be lost on appeal. The parties may agree on a minimum sum of wages owing, but disagree on the total sum owed. The Court, acting under s 256, could make an order to the extent of the agreed amount, and then alter that award if the subsequently decided wage proceedings so required. The exact interest in the forfeit property is, after all, the product of an entitlement to wages as finally determined. 
[29]
As to Sajo's reliance on the past tense “determined”, Mr Lange submitted that is of no moment given the other language used, and it is wrong to anchor an argument on the tense of a word. He submitted that use of the past tense simply implies that the wage claim at some stage must be determined, but the Act should be taken to refer to a determination made at any time, even after forfeiture proceedings have been commenced. 
[30]
Mr Lange observed that requiring foreign crew members to pursue proceedings against their employers in the ERA could sometimes mean that they had no standing in forfeiture proceedings. Where the crew members' employer ceased to exist as an entity against which proceedings could be brought in the ERA, or where the crew members had neither the time nor the money to undertake lengthy legal proceedings in a foreign country, they would be unable to seek relief against forfeiture. This led Mr Lange to submit that the forfeiture claim need not wait until wage-specific proceedings had been completed, and requiring such a wait cannot have been the legislative intent. 
[31]
The Ministry also contested Sajo's position that the District Court was without jurisdiction in determining the nature and extent of an interest which in total exceeded $200,000. Since the Ministry's position was that the District Court could determine the nature of an interest, and grant forfeiture relief, it followed that the Court must be entitled to make the prior determination as to the merit and quantum of the wage claim. Otherwise, the Court could not be assured of the necessity of making an order, as required by s 256(7). 
[32]
For the crew members, Ms Harding was content to adopt these submissions for the Ministry. 
The “cross-appeal” — CIV-2015-409-500 
[33]
The crew members filed what I describe as a cross-appeal against the second District Court judgment, which held that they could hold an interest in a forfeit vessel for unpaid wages only if they had worked on that vessel. Ms Harding submitted that the Judge's construction of s 256 of the Act was too narrow. To interpret the term “forfeit property” to include only the physical property directly associated with employment was submitted too restrictive, as the wage obligation here may be that of an employer who owned other forfeit property. The interest in “forfeit property” should be interpreted to include the employer's sister ships forfeit to the Crown. 
[34]
Ms Harding made a spirited challenge, stressing what she submitted were public policy principles, including the proposition that it would be unfair for foreign crew to be deprived of their interest in wages attaching to a ship simply because that ship had sunk. She acknowledged that any construction that a Court decided to give to s 256 would not impede in personam claims that the crew members might have against Sajo, but urged the Court to realise that it might, and probably would, prove difficult to bring that claim in New Zealand. The thrust of this submission is that justice requires the Court to interpret s 256 in a manner consistent with mitigating the plight of the crew members, so far as possible. 
[35]
While stressing the unfortunate circumstances of the crew members, Ms Harding's submissions did not rely on a simple appeal to justice to stimulate the Court's thinking. She referred to the Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Crew) Amendment Act 2002, which amended s 256 of the Fisheries Act. Before that amendment, s 256 of the 1996 Act gave standing in forfeiture proceedings only to those who had ownership rights in respect of foreign vessels at the time of forfeiture; nothing less would suffice. The 2002 Act provided standing to those who could establish one of the interests now included in s 256(1)(b) of the 1996 Act. One of those interests is in unpaid wages. 
[36]
Ms Harding says the Parliamentary intention was to give standing to the crew of foreign vessels not simply where the ship on which they worked was forfeit, but more generally where their entitlement to wages was at large. The 2002 legislation, she submitted, was designed to remedy the generally disadvantaged position of foreign crew, who for reasons of language, nationality and money, or rather lack of it, would find it difficult to pursue their employer under the employment contract. The warrant for the 2002 Act should be reflected in its practical effect. She submitted its purpose was to liberally grant standing to foreign crew in New Zealand forfeiture proceedings. 
[37]
While not taken far in argument, Ms Harding canvassed the issue of maritime liens in her written submissions. A lien for unpaid wages in favour of crew (attaching to the ship on which they worked) is well entrenched in law. For the Ministry (as respondent to the cross-appeal), Mr Lange acknowledged this. 
[38]
Ms Harding employed the uncontroversial existence of such liens to argue that as a maritime lien for unpaid wages attaches to the ship on which a crew member worked, but could be transferred to a sister ship, the analogous entitlement of crew members to wages which gives rise to an interest in forfeit property should be transferrable to sister ships. The analogy was reasonably drawn because the same factual circumstances underlie the interests. The maritime lien and the forfeiture interest may both be based on a crew member's entitlement to wages. The Court is asked to import the operation of the maritime lien into its consideration of s 256, to allow the forfeiture interest to attach to sister ships. The remedies of maritime lien and forfeiture claim would in that respect be in sync. 
[39]
The Ministry did not regard that submission as sound. Mr Lange submitted that the only manner in which a lien could attach to a ship other than that on which a crew member worked was under the Admiralty Act 1973. Section 5(2)(b) of that Act provides: 
“(b)
in questions and claims specified in paragraphs (d) to (r) of subsection (1) of section 4 arising in connection with a ship where the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam was, when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control of, the ship, the jurisdiction of the High Court may (whether the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on the ship or not) be invoked by an action in rem against— 
(i)
that ship if, at the time when the action is brought, it is beneficially owned as respects all the shares therein by, or is on charter by demise to, that person; or 
(ii)
any other ship which, at the time when the action is brought, is beneficially owned or on charter by demise as aforesaid. ”
[40]
One of those “questions and claims” is that of unpaid wages.9
| X |Footnote: 9
Admiralty Act 1973, s 4(1)(o). 
Sounding the loudest in that section for this element of the cross-appeal is subsection (b)(ii). Combined with the first paragraph of (b), it allows a crew member who has a cause of action for wages in personam to proceed in rem against property of that person. The crew member can also invoke the in rem claim against any other property which was in the beneficial ownership of the other party at the time of the action. 
[41]
The crew members who bring the cross-appeal would have been entitled to bring in rem proceedings against any of the Oyang vessels under the Admiralty Act, had those vessels been in the beneficial ownership of Sajo. Their problem was that one vessel had sunk and the other vessels were forfeit, and therefore owned by the Crown. The Crown took the vessels free of all encumbrances under s 255E(1) of the Fisheries Act and a claim in rem is barred. 
[42]
Mr Lange submitted that since the crew members had not taken advantage of this route to enforce their wage claim against other property of Sajo, their options in that regard were spent. 
[43]
As second respondents to the cross-appeal, Sajo submitted that nothing in ss 255A to 255D, nor in s 256, gives the Court reason to interpret ss 256(1)(b) (as to “forfeit property”) or 256(1)(c) (as to “interest”) other than pursuant to the specific definitions given to those words. The definitions given in s 256 were submitted exhaustive. 
Section 256 Fisheries Act 1996 
[44]
This (relevantly) provides: 
“(1)
In this section, unless the context otherwise requires,— 
forfeit property means any— 
(a)
fish and any proceeds from the sale of such fish; or 
(b)
property used in the commission of the offence; or 
(c)
quota— 
forfeit to the Crown under any of sections 255A to 255D 
interest means,— 
(a)
(b)
in the case of a foreign vessel, a foreign-owned New Zealand fishing vessel, or a foreign-operated fish carrier,— 
(i)
ownership; and 
(ii)
an interest, as determined by the Employment Relations Authority or any court, that any fishing crew have in unpaid wages; and 
(iii)
an interest in costs incurred by a third party (other than the employer) to provide for the support and repatriation of foreign crew employed on the vessel: 
(c)
in the case of other forfeit property, a legal or equitable interest in that forfeit property that existed at the time of the forfeiture; but does not include any interest (other than an interest referred to in paragraph (b)) in a foreign vessel, a foreign-owned New Zealand fishing vessel, or a foreign-operated fish carrier. 
(2)
Where— 
(a)
the forfeiture occurs under any of sections 255B to 255D; and 
(b)
the forfeit property has a total estimated value of $200 or more,— 
the chief executive must, within 10 working days after the date of the forfeiture, publicly notify the details of the forfeit property, and the right of any person to apply to the court for relief from the effects of forfeiture. 
(3)
Any person claiming an interest in any forfeit property may, within 35 working days after the date of the forfeiture or within such further period before the property is disposed of as the court may allow, apply to the court for relief from the effect of forfeiture on that interest. 
(4)
Every application under subsection (3) shall contain sufficient information to identify the interest and the property in which it is claimed, and shall include— 
(a)
a full description of the forfeit property in which the interest is claimed, including reference to any registration or serial number; and 
(b)
full details of the interest or interests claimed, including— 
(i)
whether the interest is legal or equitable; and 
(ii)
whether the interest is by way of security or otherwise; and 
(iii)
if the interest is by way of security, details of the security arrangement and any other property included in that arrangement; and 
(iv)
whether the interest is noted on any register maintained pursuant to statute; and 
(v)
any other interests in the property known to the applicant; and 
(c)
[Repealed] 
(d)
the applicant's estimate of the value of the forfeit property and of the value of the claimed interest. 
(5)
The court shall hear all applications in respect of the same property together, unless it considers that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. 
(6)
The court shall, in respect of every application made under subsection (3),— 
(a)
determine the value of the forfeit property, being the amount the property would realise if sold at public auction in New Zealand; and 
(b)
determine the nature, extent, and, if possible, the value of any applicant's interest in the property; and 
(c)
[Repealed] 
(d)
determine the cost to the Ministry of the prosecution of the offence which resulted in the forfeiture, and the seizure, holding, and anticipated cost of disposal of the forfeit property, including the court proceedings in respect of that seizure, holding, and disposal. 
(7)
Having determined the matters specified in subsection (6), the court may, after having regard to— 
(a)
the purpose of this Act; and 
(b)
the effect of the offence from which the forfeiture arose on the aquatic environment from which the fish, aquatic life, or seaweed was taken or in which the vessel was operating; and 
(c)
the effect of the offence from which the forfeiture arose on other fishers (whether commercial or otherwise) fishing in the area or for the stock in respect of which the offence occurred; and 
(d)
the effect of offending of the type from which the forfeiture arose on the relevant aquatic environment; and 
(e)
the effect of offending of the type from which the forfeiture arose on other fishers (whether commercial or otherwise) fishing in the area or for the stock in respect of which the offence occurred; and 
(f)
the social and economic effects on the person who owned the property or quota, and on persons employed by that person, of non-release of the property or quota; and 
(g)
the effect of offending of the type from which the forfeiture arose on fisheries management and administration systems (including the keeping of records and the providing of returns); and 
(h)
the previous offending history (if any) of the person from whose conviction the forfeiture arose; and 
(i)
the economic benefits that accrued or might have accrued to the owners of the property or quota through the commission of the offence; and 
(j)
the prevalence of offending of the type from which the forfeiture arose; and 
(k)
the cost to the Ministry of the prosecution of the offence which resulted in the forfeiture, and the seizure, holding, and anticipated cost of disposal of the property or quota, including the court proceedings in respect of that seizure, holding, and disposal,— 
and, subject to subsection (8), make an order or orders providing relief (either in whole or part) from the effect of forfeiture on any of the interests determined under subsection (6). 
(8)
No order shall be made under subsection (7) unless— 
(a)
it is necessary to avoid manifest injustice or to satisfy an interest referred to in paragraph (b)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of interest in subsection (1). ”
The (first) appeal - discussion 
[45]
The competing positions have been outlined on the appeal. Two questions fall for judgment. The first is whether the crew members must have had their wage claim determined other than in the “forfeiture Court” before they can claim an interest in forfeit property under the Fisheries Act. The second is whether the District Court has jurisdiction to determine the wage claim in this instance. 
Wage claim and “forfeiture claim” - concurrent or sequential? — which Courts or Tribunals? 
[46]
The relevant provisions of s 256(1) provide: 
interest means,— 
(a)
(b)
in the case of a foreign vessel, a foreign-owned New Zealand fishing vessel, or a foreign-operated fish carrier,— 
(i)
ownership; and 
(ii)
an interest, as determined by the Employment Relations Authority or any court, that any fishing crew have in unpaid wages; and 
(iii)
an interest in costs incurred by a third party (other than the employer) to provide for the support and repatriation of foreign crew employed on the vessel: 
(c)
in the case of other forfeit property, a legal or equitable interest in that forfeit property that existed at the time of the forfeiture; but does not include any interest (other than an interest referred to in paragraph (b)) in a foreign vessel, a foreign-owned New Zealand fishing vessel, or a foreign-operated fish carrier. ”
(Emphasis added) 
[47]
A range of potential answers is immediately identifiable. “Determined” may mean “determined in distinct proceedings, before the forfeiture proceedings”, or “determined somewhere before any interest in forfeit property can be finally determined”, or it may mean “determined at some time, not necessarily before establishing an interest in forfeit property”. Mr Squire argued for the first of these interpretations, while the first and second respondents argued for the third. I regard the second as correct for the following reasons. 
[48]
It would be too speculative to find that an interest exists in unpaid wages so as to compel the Crown to allocate part of the proceeds of sale of forfeit property, without any settled legal basis for that interest. A finding that a crew member has a legal interest in forfeit property rests on a finding that wages are owing. An interest cannot be established on the basis of a mere allegation of being owed wages. Otherwise the Crown would be compelled to pay money to crew who simply allege (with some, but not necessarily much, specificity) that they are entitled to wages arising from their work on a ship. No legal entitlement would need to be proved before relief was ordered. The claim could be wholly without merit and the estimate of quantum could be wholly misplaced. 
[49]
The nature of payments ordered in forfeiture proceedings in my view compels reading s 256 as requiring a prior determination of the wage claim before relief can be finally ordered. Forfeiture proceedings can be launched against the Crown in lieu of proceedings against the former owner of that property. Relief may be ordered when an interest is established in the former owner's property, not when an interest is simply asserted. If the property had not been forfeit, the crew members would have had to establish their claim to wages against Sajo before receiving any money. The mere act of forfeiture cannot advance their position. Claims to unpaid wages and other breaches of employment law remain just that, claims. 
[50]
I do not accept the submission that the expressions “if possible” and “estimate” in relation to the valuation of the claimant's interest are signals that s 256 contemplated contingent claims to an interest in forfeiture (that is, before the basis for an interest is made out). Sections 256(4)(d) and 256(6)(b), in which these expressions appear, relate to any claims made under s 256(3), not simply to claims where the interest is founded on unpaid wages. Those qualifying expressions “if possible” and “estimate” will apply in many cases involving interests arising from forfeit fishing quotas (s 256(1)(a)), legal or equitable interests in other forfeit property (s 256(1)(c)) and “interest[s] in costs incurred by a third party … to provide for the support and repatriation of foreign crew employed on the vessel” (s 256(1)(b)(iii)). 

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